



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDER
NAVSUP GLOBAL LOGISTICS SUPPORT
937 N HARBOR DRIVE
SAN DIEGO CA 92132-0001

IN REPLY REFER TO
5830
Ser 00/281
15 Sept 17

FINAL ENDORSEMENT on [REDACTED] Command Investigation of 10 Jun 17

From: Commander, NAVSUP Global Logistics Support
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FUEL SPILL THAT OCCURRED AT
NAVAL AIR STATION OCEANA ON 11 MAY 2017

1. I have reviewed the subject investigation, and concur with the findings of fact and opinions of the investigating officer. I further concur with the recommendations of the investigating officer, and the exceptions to those recommendations as set forth by the Commanding Officer, FLC Norfolk. This investigation is closed.

2. My point of contact for this matter is [REDACTED] can be reached at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] for any questions regarding this matter.


J. R. McNEAL



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVSUP FLEET LOGISTICS CENTER NORFOLK
1968 GILBERT STREET SUITE 600
NORFOLK VA 23511-3392

IN REPLY REFER TO

5800

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16 Jun 2017

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on [REDACTED] Command Investigation of
10 June 17

From: Commanding Officer, NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center Norfolk

To: Commander, NAVSUP Global Logistics Support

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FUEL SPILL THAT OCCURRED AT
NAVAL AIR STATION OCEANA ON 11 MAY 2017

Ref: (a) JAGMAN, Chapter II

Encl: (1) Report of Command Investigation into the Fuel Spill at NAS Oceana

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded in accordance with reference (a).
2. I have reviewed enclosure (1), and concur with the findings of fact and opinion of the investigating officer. I concur with the recommendations, with the following exceptions:
 - a. Recommend nonjudicial punishment for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] due to dereliction of duty (failure to provide effective leadership generating clear procedures and expectations of performance to junior Sailors in their charge, while creating a toxic command climate that inhibited the professional development of their Sailors and overall performance of the mission). [REDACTED] **CONCUR for [REDACTED] DRB/XOI process will be utilized for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to determine follow-on actions.**

- b. Qualify all military at NAS Oceana Fuels Division as bulk fuel operators to increase operational flexibility. [REDACTED] **DO NOT CONCUR – Personnel will be specially selected, trained and qualified for this duty.**

3. Action is complete for the following recommendations:

- a. Removed [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] duties as NAS Oceana Fuels [REDACTED]
- b. Removed [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] duties as NAS Oceana Fuels [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- c. Relocation of Director, Code 425 to NAVSUP FLC Norfolk to allow NAS Oceana SUPPO to be more effective in [REDACTED] position. [REDACTED] Code 425 has been assigned as a division under Code 400. The former Director, Code 425, has been reassigned within the Code 500 and the Deputy Director, Code 425, has been relocated to NAVSUP FLC Norfolk, building W-143, and is now the Division Director, Code 425.

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d. Review, update, and validate organizational alignment of NAVSUP FLC Norfolk Code 425, Supply Department, and Fuels Division to improve Command and Control. Move NAVSUP FLC Norfolk Code 425 from NAS Oceana to NAVSUP FLC Norfolk HQ building. [REDACTED] Code 425.2 Supply Department (RSO Oceana) has been assigned under Code 400. Code 425.2 Fuels Division has been reassigned under Code 700 (NAVSUP FLC Norfolk Regional Fuel Department).

4. Additional actions have already been taken. They include:

a. Installation of spring loaded valve to the filter separator low point drain to mitigate risk of future inadvertent discharges.

b. Sailors are being permanently assigned to Bulk Tanks vice rotationally assigned.

c. Adding additional civilian personnel to the workforce to provide greater continuity and expertise.

5. My point of contact on this case will be [REDACTED] can be reached at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. Additional point of contact is [REDACTED] can be reached at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED].


J. M. LOWTHER

Copy to:
File
Legal Officer

10 JUN 17

From: [REDACTED] Investigating Officer
To: Commanding Officer, NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center Norfolk

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FUEL SPILL THAT OCCURRED AT
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Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7E
(b) Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Manual for Courts-Martial (2016 ed.)

Encl: (1) Appointing Order, [REDACTED] dtd 11 May 17
(2) Appointing Order, [REDACTED] dtd 11 May 17
(3) NAVSUP FLC Norfolk Organization Chart
(4) Fuel Farm Maps, Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3, dtd Nov 16
(5) NAS Oceana Fuels Division Watchbill
(6) Section Leader Turnover, dtd 11 May 17, 0700-1500
(7) Section Leader Turnover, dtd 11 May 17, 1500-2300
(8) Section Leader Turnover, dtd 11 May 17, 2300-0700
(9) RSO Fuel Rounds Log, dtd 10 May 17
(10) Receipt Log Example
(11) Excerpt from Fuels Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
(12) Final Qualification Exam for 307 Fuel Farm Operator
(13) Final Qualification Personnel Qualification Standard for 307 Fuel Farm Operator, NAVEDTRA 43288-C
(14) Spreadsheet of NAS Fuels Division Qualifications as of 11 May 17
(15) Final Qualification, 307 Fuel Farm Operator, [REDACTED] dtd 13 Jun 14
(16) Final Qualification, 307 Fuel Farm Operator, [REDACTED] dtd 17 Jul 15
(17) Memo, Regional Supply Officer to Deputy Fuels Director, Subj: Delegation of Authority ..., dtd 19 Aug 16
(18) Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights form, [REDACTED] dtd 17 May 17
(19) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED], dtd 17 May 17
(20) Memorandum for the Record, Oceana Spill Rate Calculations and Photographs
(21) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 12 May 17
(22) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] dtd 24 May 17
(23) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] 23 May 17
(24) Statement, [REDACTED] dtd 18 May 17
(25) Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights form, [REDACTED] dtd 18 May 17
(26) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] dtd 18 May 17
(27) Initial Statement made without Art. 31(b) Rights Advisements of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
(28) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] dtd 8 June 17

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- (29) Pertinent Portions from Naval Supply Systems Command, Global Logistics Support Assist Visit to Fleet Logistics Center, Norfolk, dtd 24 May 17
- (30) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 25 May 17
- (31) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] dtd 24 May 17
- (32) Photograph of Filter Separator and Convault
- (33) Memorandum for the Record, Condition of the Bulk Fuel Facilities at NAS Oceana, dtd 8 Jun 17
- (34) Email from [REDACTED] dtd 24 May 17
- (35) Operations Order, dtd 10 May 17
- (36) Valve Alignment for Taking Fuel from North Landing in Stowage Tank F-8, dtd 16 May 17
- (37) Memorandum for the Record, Visit to NUSTAR North Landing Site, dtd 16 May 17
- (38) Fuel Spill Timeline May 2017 provided by [REDACTED] 15 May 17
- (39) Receipt from NuStar Log, 10-11 May 17
- (40) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 12 May 17
- (41) Statements of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] dtd 9 Jun 17
- (42) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 12 May 17
- (43) Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights form, [REDACTED] dtd 19 May 17
- (44) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] dtd 19 May 17
- (45) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 22 May 17
- (46) Statements of [REDACTED] dtd 9 Jun 17
- (47) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 11 May 17
- (48) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 8 Jun 17
- (49) Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights form, [REDACTED] dtd 19 May 17
- (50) Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and Waiver of Rights form, [REDACTED] dtd 19 May 17; and Letter of Representation from Attorney [REDACTED] dtd 19 May 17
- (51) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] dtd 19 May 17
- (52) Photograph showing the sight line from the door of the Bulk Fuel Office to the Bulk Fuel Tanks
- (53) Google Maps computation of the distance from the door of the Bulk Fuel Office to the Bulk Fuel Tanks
- (54) Email from [REDACTED] Weather Data for May 10-12, 2017
- (55) Statement of [REDACTED] USN, dtd 18 May 17
- (56) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 23 May 17
- (57) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 22 May 17
- (58) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 18 May 17
- (59) NAS Oceana Supply Department Organization Chart
- (60) Statement of [REDACTED], dtd 23 May 17
- (61) Statement of [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], dtd 23 May 17

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- (62) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 24 May 17
- (63) Statement of [REDACTED] dtd 23 May 17
- (64) Memorandum for the Record, Interview of [REDACTED] dtd 24 May 17
- (65) Memorandum for the Record, Verbal Counseling of [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] dtd 9 Jun 17
- (66) Emails from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] dtd 19 May 17 and 24 May 17

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Per enclosures (1) and (2) [REDACTED] and I were directed to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the fuel spill that occurred at NAS Oceana on 11 May 2017, and whether or not the culture and climate in the Fuels Division at Naval Air Station Oceana (NAS Oceana) was a contributing factor. We were directed to report our findings in a report by 26 May 2017, in accordance with reference (a). Legal guidance was provided by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as well as OGC counsel [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] during the course of this investigation. A verbal extension until 10 June 2017 date was granted by the CO of NAVSUP FLCN on 24 May 2017.

2. The investigation results as outlined below are as follows:

a. On 10 May 2017, beginning at approximately 1400, JP-5 jet fuel flowing through the fully open Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve into the attached convault tank began spilling from the vent atop the tank in the Bulk Fuel Facility located at Naval Air Station Oceana (NAS Oceana). Over the next about 16.5 hours, around 94,000 gallons of fuel was spilled at a rate of approximately 94 gallons per minute. The fuel spill was noted by civilian employees and stopped by closing the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve at 0625 on 11 May 2017.

b. The Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve was fully functional at the time of the spill. Evidence gathered in this investigation strongly suggests that the cause of the spill was due to the drain valve being left open by watchstander [REDACTED] sometime shortly after [REDACTED] watch began at 1400 on 10 May 2017. I recommend [REDACTED] be referred to a Special Court-Martial for [REDACTED] actions. Further, watchstanders, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] as well as watch supervisor [REDACTED] failed to conduct rounds during their respective watch periods, actions which contributed to the continued loss of fuel for approximately 16.5 hours. I recommend that these sailors receive Non-Judicial Punishment for their actions.

c. I also found leadership failures on multiple levels in the Supply Department and Fuels Division at NAS Oceana, and recommend [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] receive Non-Judicial Punishment. Further, as Code 425 Director, [REDACTED] had ultimate oversight of the NAS Oceana Supply Department, and was in the best position to manage the many shortfalls of the Fuels Division. I recommend [REDACTED] receive a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution

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(NPLOC) due to [REDACTED] failure to recognize the severity of the issues affecting the Fuels Division. Finally, I recommend a review be conducted with OGC counsel to explore appropriate administrative action with regard to the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

3. All reasonably available evidence required for this investigation was collected and each objective of the appointing order has been met. Three witnesses were unavailable due to invocation of their rights under Article 31(b) of reference (b).

FINDINGS OF FACTS

1. The NAS Oceana Fuels Division is staffed, run, and maintained by Naval Supply Systems Command, Fleet Logistics Center, Norfolk, VA (NAVSUP FLCN). The Fuels Division is responsible for the Bulk Fuel Facility and for fueling aircraft at the NAS Oceana flight line.
[REDACTED]

2. The Fuels Division at NAS Oceana consists of a system of tanks and components interconnected by pipeline and operated by a workforce of approximately 100 civil service and military personnel. The complete Fuels Division facilities consist of three bulk storage tanks with a total capacity of 3.4M gallons of JP-5, two day servicing tanks with a capacity of just over 450,000 gallons, one convault waste fuel tank with a capacity of 2,000 gallons, eighteen refueling pits, three truck lanes, and fifteen 5,000 gallon refueling trucks. Jet fuel is mainly delivered by pipeline from the inter-coastal water ways and three truck offloading stands. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. The Fuels Division is manned at all times in three eight-hour watches of seven to eight people with one Watch Supervisor and an Assistant Watch Supervisor who are in charge of the flight line and the Bulk Fuel Facility. [REDACTED]

4. The Bulk Fuel Facility is manned during the day by civilian personnel from 0600-1400. It is unmanned the remainder of the day except during periods when actively receiving fuel, in which case military personnel stand watches from 1400 to 0600 to respond to any problems. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

5. When the Bulk Fuels Facility is unmanned, it is the responsibility of the Fuels Division Watch Supervisor, whose post is across the flight line from Bulk Fuels to tour the Bulk Fuel Facility—to include all facilities, doors, and gates—every two hours at a minimum. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

6. When the Bulk Fuel Facility is manned, there are three eight-hour watches. The week of the incident, 7-13 May 2017, the watches were manned as follows: the 0600-1400 watch is always manned by two full-time civilian Fuel Distribution System Workers (FDSWs): [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the 1400-2200 watch was manned by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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██████████ the 2200-0600 watch was manned by ██████████ and ██████████
██████████

7. The Fuels Watch Supervisor is located across the flight line from the Bulk Fuels Facility. In addition to monitoring fueling operations on the flight line, ██████████ duties include checking on the Bulk Fuels watchstanders during receipt of fuel. ██████████

8. On 10 May 2017, ██████████ was the Watch Supervisor from 0700-1500. ██████████
██████████ was the Watch Supervisor from 1500-2300. ██████████ assistant was ██████████
██████████ stood as Watch Supervisor from 2300, 10 May 2017 to 0600 11 May
2017. ██████████

9. According to the relevant Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and command practice, the watch team is responsible for maintaining a Receipt Log when receiving fuel, a Fuel Rounds Log, a Pipeline Patrol Log Sheet, and an Official Pass-Down/Event Log for each watch. Watch turnover is memorialized by a Section Leader Turn Over document. ██████████

10. Bulk Fuel Facility watch standers are required to patrol the pipeline hourly during a fuel delivery to monitor for any leaks or other problems, and document these patrols in a Pipeline Patrol Log Sheet which is passed to the Fuels Division LCPO. ██████████

11. If any leaks or other problems are encountered, the "Fuels Division LCPO will be notified immediately." The location of the problem or leak must also be clearly stated in the Pipeline Patrol Log Sheet. ██████████

12. During a fuel transfer, each Pipeline Patrol watch stander is required to ensure awareness of the SOPs for Pipeline Patrol. ██████████

13. Pipeline Patrol hourly inspections include verification that the receipt tanks have been properly isolated, and manual inspection of all skin valves, line valves, valve pits, expansion joints, pressure relief valves, pumps, and bypass valves. Watch standers are required to travel the entire length of the pipeline. ██████████

14. Each watch stander sits a qualification board and takes a qualification exam which is designed to ensure that they are familiar with the frequency with which they are to make rounds and what those rounds are to consist of. Question two of that exam asks, "How often at bulk do you make a round? What do you do during your round?" ██████████

15. The members of the qualification board are not required to be qualified themselves. ██████████
██████████

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16. As of 10 May 2017; [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were fully qualified watch standers. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were not fully qualified bulk facility watch standers. [REDACTED]

17. Watch standers are also required to check the level of all convault tanks every hour. The level is checked by manually "gauging" the tank, which requires the stander to manually insert a measuring stick into the tank and visually assess the level in the tank. [REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] stated that a prior military supervisor, [REDACTED] instructed the military watch standers to open the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve hourly during a fuel delivery. No written instruction, guidance, SOP could be found as support for this practice. [REDACTED]

19. Sailors working in the Bulk Fuels Facility have various understandings of how frequently they should open the valve. [REDACTED]

20. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] do not consider this to be necessary. The valve should only be opened when the presence of water is detected in the line. That is not a common occurrence because the fuel provider, NuStar, has a Filter-Separator on their end of the pipeline. [REDACTED] commented that he only opened that valve a handful of times over several years of working at the Bulk Fuels Facility. [REDACTED]

21. From April 24-28, 2017, Naval Supply Systems Command Global Logistics Support (NAVSUP GLS) conducted a Command Assist visit to FLCN as part of the NAVSUP Command Inspection Program, and the Assist Visit Report contained the following observations: A copy of the SOP was not located in the Bulk Fuel office during the inspection; there was no visible guidance or checklists in the Bulk Fuel office outlining the duties of the Pipeline Patrol watch standers; there was no evidence that Pipeline Control Log Sheets were kept or maintained in the Bulk Fuel office and that the preventative maintenance program for the facility was ineffective due to extreme corrosion and biological growth on fuel facilities. [REDACTED]

22. The Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve has a large metal lever that requires a moderate amount of force to move from the closed to the open positions. [REDACTED]

23. When the lever is in the vertical position, the valve is closed. The valve opens by pushing the lever to the left, in a horizontal position. [REDACTED]

24. The function of the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve is to bleed water and impurities from incoming pipeline fuel before it gets to the large bulk fuel storage tanks. The bled material goes into the convault tank for later disposal. The convault tank is no more than 20 feet from the valve. [REDACTED]

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25. The Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve was in good working condition at the time of the incident. It would not open on its own, nor would the valve open more fully if it were left partially open. [REDACTED]

Fuel Spill Timeline

9 May 2017

26. NAS Oceana emailed NuStar at North Landing, a government contractor, with a request for 810,000 gallons of fuel, particularly JP-5. [REDACTED]

27. NuStar North Landing was directed to deliver said fuel via pipeline to NAS Oceana Bulk Fuel Facility. The email from NAS Oceana did not direct when the transfer was to occur. [REDACTED]

10 May 2017

28. [REDACTED] was assigned the role of Watch Supervisor from 0700 to 1500. [REDACTED]

29. [REDACTED] completed an Operations Order (OPORD) at 0800, and as required by that Order and NAS Oceana SOP, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] completed the necessary valve alignment for delivery of JP-5 from NuStar into Tank F-8. [REDACTED]

30. The OPORD states that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were assigned to "Tank," which means they were required to prepare valve alignment before commencement of fuel delivery and to monitor the pipeline and delivery until that responsibility was passed to military personnel. [REDACTED]

31. The OPORD states that [REDACTED] and another [REDACTED] (not yet designated at the time the OPORD was signed, but later identified as [REDACTED]) were assigned as "Pipeline Patrol", which includes monitoring of the pipelines during a fuel delivery. [REDACTED]

32. NuStar North Landing began fuel transfer to NAS Oceana Bulk Fuel Facility at approximately 0935 and [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] noted that NAS Oceana began receipt of fuel from NuStar North Landing at approximately 0937. [REDACTED]

33. Between 0930 and 1300, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] completed hourly inspections required by the SOP. During those inspections, no abnormalities were noted. [REDACTED]

34. At 1230, before he assumed the watch, [REDACTED] was contacted to designate a Pipeline Safety Observer for the upcoming Bulk Fuel watch. [REDACTED] designated [REDACTED]

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35. [REDACTED] completed a final inspection of Bulk Fuel Facility and reported all systems normal at 1345. [REDACTED] stated the valve was closed at that time. [REDACTED]
36. [REDACTED] checked in with the Bulk Fuel Facility as part of [REDACTED] normal round at 1345. [REDACTED]
37. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] completed turnover with [REDACTED] in the Bulk Fuel office at 1400. They did not conduct a joint inspection of Bulk Fuel Facility. [REDACTED]
38. At 1400 [REDACTED] assumed the watch as Bulk Fuel Facility Operator. [REDACTED]
39. [REDACTED] gave an initial statement to [REDACTED] chain of command on 11 May 2017 during the course of an initial inquiry to discover what happened. When it was subsequently determined that [REDACTED] may have been responsible for the incident [REDACTED] was advised of rights, which [REDACTED] invoked to retain counsel and remain silent. [REDACTED]
40. An operational fuel flow test was conducted on 18 May 2017 to establish a flow rate for the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve into the convault tank. Based on the flow rate and the amount of fuel that was lost, it is estimated that valve was left fully open sometime from approximately 1330 to 1430 on the afternoon of 10 May 2017. [REDACTED]
41. Depending on how much fuel was already in the tank, sometime within 30 minutes of the valve being opened, the convault tank reached its 2,000 gallon capacity and the fuel began spilling from the vent atop the tank. [REDACTED]
42. At 1400 [REDACTED] arrived at the Bulk Fuel Facility. [REDACTED] was assigned the role of Pipeline Safety Observer. [REDACTED]
43. As Pipeline Safety Observer [REDACTED] was required to complete all Pipeline Patrols with [REDACTED]
44. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] opened and closed the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve at 1400 and 1600. [REDACTED]
45. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had opened the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve at 1400 on 10 May 2017. [REDACTED] also asserted that [REDACTED] secured the valve after five seconds and opened the valve again at 1600 that same day using the same procedure. [REDACTED]
46. When [REDACTED] was asked to describe the route [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] took during their inspection, [REDACTED] drew the route they took on a map which went through a gate known to have been locked for two days prior without access to the key. [REDACTED]

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47. [REDACTED] when confronted with the discrepancies in [REDACTED] statement, admitted that [REDACTED] did not go out with [REDACTED] for any inspections and then elected to end the interview. [REDACTED]
48. The Receipt Log states that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] performed hourly checks of the Differential Pressure Gauge for Filter-Separator No. 3. It does not indicate who filled out the log. [REDACTED]
49. The Differential Pressure Gauge for Filter-Separator No. 3 is located within unobstructed line of sight of the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve. [REDACTED]
50. [REDACTED] was assigned the role of Watch Supervisor from 1500 to 2300. The watch supervisor's post is across the flight line from the Bulk Fuels Facility [REDACTED]
51. As Watch Supervisor, [REDACTED] was required to visit the Bulk Fuel Facility every two hours, 1500, 1700, 1900 and 2100. [REDACTED] stated that due to heavy flight operations, [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] assistant, [REDACTED] at 1500. [REDACTED] made the trip [REDACTED] at 1700 and 1900, and called into the Bulk Fuels Facility at 2100 due to increased demands on the flight line. [REDACTED]
52. [REDACTED] instructed [REDACTED] assistant watch supervisor, to make the 1500 round, and stated that [REDACTED] departed in a command vehicle and returned later reporting that all conditions were normal in the Bulk Fuel Facility. [REDACTED]
53. [REDACTED] was not qualified in Bulk Fuels and did not talk to anyone when [REDACTED] did the Bulk Fuel portion of [REDACTED] rove. [REDACTED]
54. At 1500, [REDACTED] drove a command vehicle to the Bulk Fuels area and returned without getting out of the vehicle or speaking to [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. Upon [REDACTED] return [REDACTED] reported to [REDACTED] that all conditions were normal. [REDACTED]
55. [REDACTED] roved all of [REDACTED] assigned spaces at 1700 and 1900, but only went to the Bulk Fuel Office, and not further into the facility as it was common practice in the division to go to the Bulk Fuel Office only. [REDACTED]
56. Due to heavy flight operations, [REDACTED] checked in telephonically at 2100 with [REDACTED] rather than go physically to the Bulk Fuel Facility. [REDACTED] reported that all conditions were normal. [REDACTED]
57. At 2130, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] arrived at NAS Oceana and relieved [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at the gate outside of the Bulk Fuel Facility. [REDACTED] asserted that some turnover occurred, but there was no turnover inspection. [REDACTED]

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58. ██████ told ██████ chain of command the morning of 11 May 17 that ██████ and ██████
████████ conducted their required hourly rounds throughout their shift. When questioned on a
later date after it had been determined ██████ may have committed an offense and was advised of
██████ rights, ██████ retained counsel and invoked ██████ right to remain silent. ██████

59. At 2230, ██████ and ██████ began an inspection of the fuel line, but they
only went to the receiving pad and did not inspect the convault tank, measure the convault tank
levels, or check the Differential Pressure Gauge for Filter-Separator No. 3 due to inclement
weather. ██████

60. At night, neither the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve nor the vent through
which the JP-5 was spilling is visible from either the receiving pad or the Bulk Fuels Office.
████████

61. The Receipt Log states that ██████ and ██████ performed hourly checks of
the Differential Pressure Gauge for Filter-Separator No. 3. ██████

62. ██████ admitted that ██████ filled out the Receipt Log, but that neither ██████ nor ██████
████████ actually checked the Differential Pressure Gauge for Filter-Separator No. 3 during
their watch. ██████ on the other hand, told ██████ chain of command that they had made
those rounds. ██████

63. ██████ stated that ██████ did not conduct hourly inspections because of the weather, and
because ██████ assumed that monitoring fuel levels in the large bulk fuel storage tanks by digital
meter in the Bulk Fuel Office was sufficient. ██████

64. The digital meter in the Bulk Fuel Office monitors the capacity of the receiving tank but is
not designed to detect leaks in the pipeline prior to entry into the tank. ██████

65. On 10 May 2017, NAS Oceana set condition T-2 which indicates lightning within two miles,
though there was no precipitation. On 11 May 2017, there were light thunderstorms and rain
from 0220 to 0420. ██████

66. ██████ was assigned the role of Watch Supervisor from 2300 to 0700. ██████

67. ██████ recorded in the Fuel Rounds Log that ██████ did ██████ normal rounds every two
hours for ██████ entire watch. ██████

68. ██████ admitted that ██████ did not go to the bulk facility or call the facility during ██████
entire watch. ██████

11 May 2017

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69. At 0545, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] received a call from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] saying that they were at the bulk fuel entrance gate and asked if they were ready to go. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] responded that there "was nothing going on," and left without any turnover with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

70. At 0605 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] began their inspection of the Bulk Fuel Facility [REDACTED]

71. At approximately 0625, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] approached the convault tank and saw fuel geysering or spraying through the vent at a diameter of about 15 feet in all directions. [REDACTED]

72. [REDACTED] ran to the Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve and saw that it was fully open. [REDACTED] immediately closed the valve. [REDACTED]

73. [REDACTED] notified [REDACTED] about the fuel spill at 0630. [REDACTED]

74. [REDACTED] notified the Base Emergency Line at 0632 and the NAS Oceana Fire Department was immediately dispatched to the scene. [REDACTED]

75. At 0635, [REDACTED] called NuStar North Landing, and ordered them cease the fuel delivery. At the same time, [REDACTED] notified [REDACTED] about the spill. [REDACTED]

76. Between 0645 and 0715, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were applying absorbent diapers to the ditches around the Bulk Fuel Facility and downstream to the ditches flowing to London Bridge Road. [REDACTED]

77. NAS Oceana Fire Department arrived on scene at the Bulk Fuel Facility at 0700. [REDACTED]

78. Between 0735 and 0800 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] arrived on base and proceeded to the Bulk Fuel Facility. [REDACTED] arrived at the Bulk Fuel Facility at 0830. [REDACTED]

79. At approximately 0800, [REDACTED] instructed Dispatch to send the Maintenance Work Center personnel with vacuum trucks to assist the Virginia Beach Fire Department with mitigation efforts on London Bridge Road. [REDACTED]

80. At 0900, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] escorted NAS Oceana CO and XO around the spill site so that they could assess the extent. [REDACTED]

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81. For the rest of the day, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] coordinated cleanup efforts and began speaking to the watch standers to try and determine the cause of the incident. [REDACTED]

82. At 1150, Fleet Logistics Center Norfolk released the OPREP Navy Blue message. [REDACTED]

83. At 1825, [REDACTED] released the Oil Spill SITREP to the Defense Logistics Agency. [REDACTED]

Leadership

84. The scope of this investigation included whether or not the culture and climate in the Fuels Division at NAS Oceana was a contributing factor to the 11 May 2017 fuel spill. [REDACTED]

85. The Fuels Division at NAS Oceana is organized under Code 425 of NAVSUP FLC Norfolk. The following is the direct chain of command of the sailors who were on watch before, during, and after the incident:

-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-



86. The sailors and leadership involved in the incident and their leadership who provided statements exhibit some common criticisms of the Fuels Division leadership. [REDACTED]

87. Several sailors indicated that their CPOs were unapproachable. [REDACTED]

88. Several junior sailors and senior leaders commented that the CPOs and [REDACTED] were frequently absent from work due to poorly-managed personal issues or because they adopted an "I'm on shore duty" attitude. [REDACTED]

89. Some sailors complained that the CPOs played favorites and were conversely mean to those who were not favorites. [REDACTED]

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90. Some sailors and leadership reported that the animosity between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] created a rift in the military/civilian relationship and a breakdown in the chain of command. [REDACTED]
91. At least one sailor has complained that [REDACTED] chain of command is unorganized with regard to people knowing pass down information and who is in charge. [REDACTED]
92. At least one sailor has complained that [REDACTED] is unreasonable and takes advantage of [REDACTED] position by calling sailors in on days off unnecessarily and berating sailors for no reason. [REDACTED]
93. With the exception of the Organizational Chart, no other document or statement gathered in this investigation makes any reference to [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
94. [REDACTED] was described as unavailable, unapproachable, intimidating, and having no interest in getting to know the sailors under [REDACTED] charge. [REDACTED]
95. [REDACTED] family care issues cause [REDACTED] to be absent from work or late often. [REDACTED]
96. [REDACTED] leadership has found [REDACTED] lacking in proactivity and the ability to follow up on taskers. [REDACTED]
97. [REDACTED] has been described as unapproachable, intimidating, and lacking the technical knowledge to adequately aid [REDACTED] sailors. [REDACTED]
98. [REDACTED] medical and pre-retirement issues cause [REDACTED] to be absent from work so often that it appears to [REDACTED] sailors that [REDACTED] is gone more than [REDACTED] is present. [REDACTED]
99. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] have recommended that [REDACTED] be removed from [REDACTED] position as Division LCPO. [REDACTED]
100. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both describe [REDACTED] as avoiding work, frequently absent due to family care issues, creating division between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], and having an "I'm on shore duty" mentality. [REDACTED]
101. [REDACTED] upon interviewing several junior sailors, discovered that [REDACTED] warned [REDACTED] junior sailors that if they brought any divisional management issues to [REDACTED] that they would be fired. This was confirmed in an interview with [REDACTED]
102. [REDACTED] describes [REDACTED] as lacking any sense of urgency. [REDACTED]

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103. [REDACTED] predecessor was [REDACTED] now retired. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had
"a great working relationship with [REDACTED] and a cautious relationship with [REDACTED]" [REDACTED]

104. [REDACTED] stated that NAS Oceana Fuels Division is the "dumping ground" for problem
ABFs, which posed significant leadership challenges. [REDACTED]

105. According to [REDACTED] while [REDACTED] was at NAS Oceana Fuels Division, the Watch
Supervisor was required to tour the Bulk Fuel Facility every two hours when receiving fuel and
every hour when not receiving fuel. [REDACTED]

106. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] instructed Bulk Fuel personnel that they would only open the
Filter-Separator No. 3 Low Point Drain Valve when necessary. [REDACTED] denied instructing them to do
so every hour. [REDACTED]

107. [REDACTED] is described as being knowledgeable and helpful when approached with an
issue. [REDACTED]

108. [REDACTED] was sent to NAS Oceana Fuels Division between 17 Oct 2016 and 5 Jan 2017
after the retirement of [REDACTED] to fill a perceived need for Navy Officer leadership to the
division and to "hold the CPOs feet to the fire" as a result of their poor performance. [REDACTED]

109. [REDACTED] tried to effect positive change, working with [REDACTED] within Fuels Division
but met resistance from [REDACTED] and the Fuels Chiefs. [REDACTED]

110. Between 14 Dec 2016 and 8 May 2017, [REDACTED] initiated several efforts to
improve the personnel situation at the NAS Oceana Fuels Division, including changing meeting
times to improve timeliness and accuracy in the pass-down of information, conducting town hall-
style meetings with junior enlisted, developing a "think tank" to meet with ASUPPO to improve
deckplate leadership, holding a meeting of Fuels Division leadership to address disunity between
civilian and military personnel, and verbally counseling [REDACTED] regarding [REDACTED]
unprofessional behavior. [REDACTED]

111. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] predecessor as NAS Oceana Supply Officer. He
was flected up to be Department Head of Code 425 in October of 2016 overseeing Supply
Operations at NAS Oceana, NAS Norfolk, and NAS Pax River. [REDACTED]

112. [REDACTED] office remained at NAS Oceana resulting in the leadership on that base
continuing to go to [REDACTED] and effectively ignore [REDACTED] for supply issues. [REDACTED]

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113. [REDACTED] was verbally counseled on 4 May 2017 by CAPT Thomas "Jack" Moreau, [REDACTED] Commanding Officer, regarding the high number of personnel issues in the Fuels Division.

114. [REDACTED] was ordered to prepare and execute a plan to address these personnel issues by CAPT Moreau, and [REDACTED] suggested starting with a stand down. [REDACTED]

115. [REDACTED] failed to respond to this directive until 19 May 2017, when [REDACTED] was ordered by [REDACTED] to conduct a safety stand down no later than 26 May 2017. [REDACTED]

OPINIONS

1. A culture of non-compliance with published operating procedures, policy, and directives has developed within the Fuels Division and been allowed to remain through inaction and tacit approval by civilian and military leadership within the Supply Department and Fuels Division. [FoF 9,10,12,13,14,17,18,19,20,21,29,43,47,57,59,62,63,68,69,86,91,105,106]
2. Command and control within the Oceana Supply Department, especially the Fuels Division, is operating in a degraded condition. [FoF 19,86-115]
3. The poor workplace climate within the Oceana Fuels Division cannot be isolated to a few individuals or a specific issue; it is a systemic problem that has persisted for years. [19,86-115]
4. Supply Department and Fuels Division leadership knowledge, involvement, and oversight of fuel operations is lacking. [FoF 15,19, 85-115]
5. Fuels Division personnel are assigned operations for which they are not properly trained. [FoF 15,16,19,21,53]
6. During movement of fuel, manual gauging of convault tank is not being performed as required by SOP. [FoF 17,59,62]
7. There is an apparent separation and disunity between the civilian personnel and military personnel. [FoF 86,90,91,101,103,109,110]
8. Operators are not using proper standard operating procedures during fuel transfer operations. [FoF 9,10,12,13,14,17,18,19,20,21,29,43,47,57,59,62,63,68,69,86,91,105,106]
9. The Watch Supervisor duties and responsibilities are not clearly defined and left to individual interpretation, especially when it comes to the bulk fuel facility. [FoF 5,7,36,50-56,67-68]
10. Material failure of the filter-separator low point valve was not a cause of this spill. [FoF 25]

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11. By [redacted] own admission and supported by the initial statement given by [redacted] [redacted] is the only Sailor who admitted to touching the filter-separator low point valve during the fuel delivery on 10-11 May 2017. The evidence strongly suggests that sometime early in [redacted] shift, roughly 1400 on 10 May 2017, [redacted] opened the valve and for an unknown reason, left it open. [FoF 39,44-45,59,62,63]

12. There is no evidence to suggest that [redacted] acted out of malicious intent, but there is insufficient evidence to rule out any possible motivation or distraction that caused [redacted] to leave the valve in the open position. [FoF 39,44-45]

13. Given the proximity to the vent from which the JP-5 was spraying, and the requirement to inspect the area where the drain valve is located, which was clearly in an open position, anyone who properly conducted required hourly pipeline patrol checks would have discovered the fuel leaking from the convault tank vent. This is proven by the fact that [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] the first people who actually did a round during this incident, discovered the spill. [FoF 17,24, 59-62,71-72]

14. After roughly 1400, neither [redacted] nor [redacted] returned to the filter separator unit because if they had, they would have discovered the JP-5 spraying from the convault tank vent. [FoF 17,24,59-62,71-72]

15. [redacted] and/or [redacted] falsely filled out the Fuels Receipt Log indicating they had conducted their required rounds from 1500-2100, when in fact they had not. [redacted]

16. Based on [redacted] admission, [redacted] and [redacted] did not conduct hourly rounds as required by SOP. [FoF 59,63]

17. Based on [redacted] admission, [redacted] falsely filled out the Fuels Receipt Log from 2200 on 10 May to 0600 on 11 May 2017. [FoF 62]

18. Sending [redacted] assistant Watch Supervisor to the Bulk Fuels facility at 1500, going there [redacted] at 1700 and 1900 and calling over there at 2100 while [redacted] flight duties required [redacted] presence at [redacted] post, [redacted] conducted [redacted] duties as Watch Supervisor in accordance with published orders. [FoF 51-56]

19. [redacted] as Watch Supervisor made no effort to perform [redacted] required rounds in person or via telephone throughout [redacted] shift ending at 0600 on 11 May. [FoF 67-68]

20. If the Sailors at the Bulk Fuels Facility had performed an effective turnover to include a walk-thru of the facility, the spill would have been discovered and its extent mitigated. [FoF 57,69,71-72]

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21. The Sailors at the Bulk Fuels Facility were given inadequate and inconsistent training on how to perform their duties. [FoF 15,16,19,21,53]
22. [REDACTED] is an ineffective leader and has further fostered a divisive relationship between the civilian and military workforce at NAS Oceana Fuels Division. [FoF 88,90,100-102,109]
23. [REDACTED] is an ineffective leader and has further exacerbated the ineffective operation of the NAS Oceana Fuels Division. [FoF 87-89,97-99,108-110]
24. [REDACTED] is an ineffective leader and has further exacerbated the ineffective operation of the NAS Oceana Fuels Division, although [REDACTED] has shown examples of effectiveness in the absence of the [REDACTED] in the past. [FoF 87-89,94-96,108-109]
25. [REDACTED] has further fostered a divisive relationship between the civilian and military workforce as NAS Oceana Fuels Division and failed to maintain the Bulk Fuels Facility appropriately. [FoF 29, 103]
26. [REDACTED] is an effective leader who made efforts to address the leadership deficiencies in the Fuels Division but during [REDACTED] short tenure was unable to overcome resistance from [REDACTED] and the Fuels Chiefs. [FoF 108-109]
27. [REDACTED] was ineffective as a leader primarily due to NAVSUP FLC Norfolk Code 425 being co-located with the Oceana Supply Department. NAS Oceana and Airwing Leadership continue to consider [REDACTED] as the NAS Oceana Supply Officer. [FoF 110-112]
28. [REDACTED] was clearly making an effort to rectify the dysfunctional personnel situation in the NAS Oceana Fuels Division as evidenced by [REDACTED] varied actions in that pursuit, but [REDACTED] ultimately was unsuccessful largely because [REDACTED] did not have buy in from the enlisted khaki leadership or [REDACTED] [FoF 108-112]
29. [REDACTED] was an ineffective leader primarily due [REDACTED] lack of effort and sense of urgency to address rampant personnel issues at the NAS Oceana Fuels Division despite being asked by [REDACTED] subordinates and told by [REDACTED] Chain of Command to fix them. [FoF 111-115]
30. Due to the fact that [REDACTED] was never mentioned by any party involved in this incident [REDACTED] [REDACTED] is adjudged to be of minimal impact on the Fuels Division. [FoF 93]

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Requalify all Supervisors, military watch standers, and Fuel Distribution System Worker (FDSW) personnel in bulk fuels facility operations immediately. [Op 1,4-6,8,13,16,19-21]

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2. Require all PQS qualification board members to consist of only qualified personnel. [Op 1,4-5,21]
3. Realign Command and Control of Code 400 fuel operations to Code 700. [Op 2]
4. Remove [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] duties as NAS Oceana Fuels Division Officer. [Op 22]
5. Remove [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] duties as NAS Oceana Fuels Division LCPO. [Op 23]
6. Recommend nonjudicial punishment for [REDACTED] due to dereliction of duty (failure to conduct rounds) and false official statement (gundecking section leader log and lying to official investigator). [Op 19]
7. Recommend nonjudicial punishment for [REDACTED] due to dereliction of duty (failure to conduct rounds), false official statement (gundecking log), and destruction of government property (loss of fuel). [Op 16-17]
8. Recommend nonjudicial punishment for [REDACTED] due to dereliction of duty (failure to conduct rounds), false official statement (lying to official investigator), and destruction of government property (loss of fuel). [Op 14-15]
9. Recommend nonjudicial punishment for [REDACTED] due to dereliction of duty (failure to conduct rounds), false official statement (gundecking log), and destruction of government property (loss of fuel). [Op 16-17]
10. Recommend Special Court Martial for [REDACTED] due to dereliction of duty (failure to close low point drain valve and failure to conduct rounds), false official statement (gundecking log and lying to chain of command), and destruction of government property (loss of fuel). [Op 11-12,14,15]
11. Recommend nonjudicial punishment for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] due to dereliction of duty (failure to provide effective leadership generating clear procedures and expectations of performance to junior sailors in their charge, while creating a toxic command climate that inhibited the professional development of their sailors and overall performance of the mission.) [Op 22-24]
12. Recommend relocation of Director, Code 425 to NAVSUP FLCN to allow NAS Oceana SUPPO to be more effective in [REDACTED] position. [Op 27]
13. Recommend a Non-Punitive Letter of Caution accompanied by verbal counseling for [REDACTED] with regard to failure to address ongoing personnel issues in a timely manner. [Op 29]

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14. Recommend no action for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [Op 18,26,27-28]
15. Update SOPs utilizing current references and policies. [Op 1]
16. Standardization of all watch standing duties in the Fuels Division to include detailed, step-by-step instructions on how to conduct a proper watch. [Op 1,9]
17. Adopt NAVAIR 00-80T-109 (NATOPS) fueling standards for the bulk fuels facility at NAS Oceana. [Op 1]
18. Review, update, and validate organizational alignment of FLC Code 425, Supply Department, and Fuels Division to improve Command and Control. Move FLC Code 425 from NAS Oceana to FLC Norfolk HQ building. [Op 2,27]
19. Review, update, and validate fuels training program. [Op 1,4-6,8,13,16,19-21]
20. Install a management-level civilian to the Bulk Fuels Facility to provide oversight and continuity regarding fuel operations, required organizational maintenance, and provide oversight and correction to [REDACTED] Further recommend command consult with OGC counsel to discuss appropriate administrative action. [Op 25]
21. Permanently assign military personnel to the Bulk Fuel Facility to work side-by-side with civilian FDSW personnel. [Op 21]
22. Qualify all military at NAS Oceana Fuels Division as bulk fuel operators to increase operational flexibility. [Op 1,4-6,8,13,16,19-21]
23. Move an E-6 or above to after hours working hours to ensure adequate leadership at all times. [Op 4]
24. Require at least one FDSW civilian on each 8 hour shift at the NAS Oceana bulk fuels facility at all times that fuel is being transferred. [Op 1,5,21]
25. Require ongoing and offgoing Bulk Fuel Facility personnel to conduct joint walk-throughs of the facility during shift turnover. [Op 20]

